Religiosity and threshold effect in social and financial performance of microfinance institutions: System GMM and non-linear threshold approaches by Mobin, Mohammad Ashraful et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Religiosity and threshold effect in social
and financial performance of
microfinance institutions: System GMM
and non-linear threshold approaches
Mohammad Ashraful Mobin and Syed Othman Alhabshi and
Mansur Masih
INCEIF, Malaysia, INCEIF, Malaysia, INCEIF, Malaysia
24. June 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65242/
MPRA Paper No. 65242, posted 24. June 2015 07:28 UTC
Religiosity and threshold effect in social and financial performance of microfinance 
 institutions: System GMM and non-linear threshold approaches  
      
Mohammad Ashraful Mobin1  Syed Othman Alhabshi2 and Mansur Masih3 
 
Abstract  
The commercialization process and over-emphasis on sustainability apparently improve 
Micro finance institutions’ financial performance and the scale in terms of total number of 
borrowers and average loan size. Whether focusing on financial sustainability is necessarily 
at the sacrifice of serving the less poor clients or social and financial performance of MFIs, 
depends on the social values and religion. The inconsistent results of previous studies 
implicate that linear regressions may be insufficient to explain the sustainability-outreach 
linkage because of potential non-linear relationship between financial sustainability and 
average loan size. To solve the puzzle, this study employs relatively advanced dynamic 
difference and system GMM as well as non-linear Hansen threshold techniques. To the best 
of our knowledge this is the first study to apply non-linear technique over a sample of 
conventional and Islamic MFIs at the same time. The results tend to indicate the existence of 
religiosity effect on the social and financial performance of microfinance institutions, while 
the study does not find any evidence of sustainability-outreach paradox. Our ﬁndings present 
important insights for Islamic and conventional microfinance managers and donors as well as 
policy makers of the country to formulate a better policy. Social performance will harmonize 
the financial performance of microfinance institutions, so the MFIs authorities should not be 
necessarily worried about the financial sustainability while focusing on outreaching the poor. 
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Introduction 
The microﬁnance industry is vibrant. Diversity of ownership in the industry is substantial. 
Member-based cooperatives, foundations, government banks, private persons, shareholder 
entities, listed commercial banks, and even multibillion dollar international banks constitute a 
colorful and rapidly growing industry. The objectives of such organizations range from 
female empowerment to high proﬁt. Among these organizations, several religion-based actors 
are involved, including Hindu, Islamic, and especially Christian organizations (Harper et al., 
2008). The relatively new practice of Islamic micro-finance institutions has an outreach of 
only 1 million Muslims compared to 650 million Muslims who are living below the average 
poverty line of developing countries. The very low outreach is due to Islamic micro-finance 
is a new phenomenon, and still is in the state of its infancy. The key is for the IMFIs to build 
capacity and capability to provide a diversified array of Shari`ah compliant Islamic micro-
finance products to the Muslims in dire need of Islamic microfinancing. 
Although many Western policy elites hold a secular world-view and equate modernization 
and secularization (Thomas, 2005), many aid and development organizations are based on 
religious principles and are managed by people who are inspired by religious beliefs. More 
important, in a purely conventional model, the basic values of large groups of poor people are 
ignored. Increasingly, several parties in the development arena seem to share this concern. A 
few years ago, the United Kingdom government initiated a project known as Faith in 
Development, a multimillion-pound research consortium. Similarly, the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign aﬀairs instituted the Knowledge Forum on Religion and Development Policy, and the 
Norwegian government recently launched a dialog initiative about religion and aid. The 
World Bank has delivered several reports on religion and development issues (e.g., Marshall 
& Keough, 2004). Clearly, there is no lack of policy interest concerning religion and 
development; however, empirical research regarding the inﬂuence of religion on development 
is fragmented and still in its infancy. 
The microfinance field has become a place of confrontation between different theoretical and 
empirical approaches. Microfinance would enable a group of people with widely different 
characteristics and / or unbanked out of the stranglehold of moneylenders, therefore including 
them financially and socially. The underlying assumption considers that the seniority in 
access to microfinance services can improve living conditions and reduce poverty among 
beneficiaries. (Koloma Y., 2010) 
However, many studies recently arisen a very important question whether an MFI’s poverty 
targeting measured by the percentage of the poorest clients affects financial sustainability of 
MFIS’s financial sustainability and how the relationship between social and financial 
performance changes after controlling the poverty level. 
Many existing studies have tried to explain the sustainability-outreach relationship by 
investigating different conditions under which it may be affected, such as regulation (Cull et 
al., 2009b; Cull et al., 2009b; Mersland and Strøm, 2009), regional distribution (Awaworyi 
and Marr, 2014), competition (Kai, 2009; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005; Cull et al., 2009), 
financing (Borgan, 2009; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007), and so forth. Conclusions are 
inconsistent-some suggest a trade-off relationship, some show a complementary linkage, 
while others indicate a mixed or no significant association between the two.  There are 
several reasons for the controversial results: 1) the vast diversity among MFIs operating 
under the definition of “microfinance”. “Microfinance institutions” is an umbrella term that 
contains many different types (Philippe, 2013); 2) sample selection biases. Except for case 
studies on individual/selected MFIs, the most popular public database for constructing a 
sample is the one developed by the MIX Market but it is questioned to have some biases in 
the data (Bauchet and Morduch, 2010); and 3) the potential non-linear relationship between 
financial sustainability and average loan size. The inconsistent results implicate that linear 
regressions may be insufficient to explain the sustainability-outreach linkage. A better choice 
over sample data may enable us to further explore the changes in the size of tradeoff or the 
changes from trade-off to synthase or vice versa. (Li,Y., 2015) 
This paper tries to investigate both religiosity and threshold effects on the relationship 
between social and financial performance of Microfinance Institutions. Poverty targeting puts 
threshold effects on an MFI’s financial sustainability and based on it, both the positive and 
the negative links between financial sustainability and average loan size are observed. To 
achieve financial viability, high poverty targeting MFIs provide relatively smaller loans to a 
larger number of borrowers while low poverty targeting MFIs serve a smaller scale of clients 
by larger loans. Besides, different poverty targeting strategies also reflect the different 
operating mechanisms in terms of interest rate, cost, risk, and capital structure. Moreover, 
there is even less in the area of Islamic microfinance and development. Thus far, the 
existence and eﬀect of religious actors in modern microﬁnance has not been addressed by 
rigorous research. From our angle, it is specifically examining Islamic based approach to 
development through micro financing schemes and social and financial economic 
performance both in Islamic and conventional sectors.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section two presents an overview of existing 
literature on the relationship between religion, development, financial sustainability, social 
outreach, and serving the poorest. Section three describes the data, variables and 
methodology used in the study. Section four presents the main empirical results and 
robustness checks. Conclusions are made in the final section. 
Theoretical Underpinning 
The term micro-finance can be described as the provision of financial service to low income 
clients, including self employed, low income entrepreneurs in both urban and rural areas. The 
micro-finance revolution which begun with independent initiatives in Latin America and 
South Asia starting in the 1970s, has so far allowed 65 million poor4 people around the world 
to receive small loans without collateral, build up assets, and buy insurance. The idea of 
micro-finance programs has come from Muhammad Yunus who began a micro-finance 
program among women in Bangladesh in 1976 through the University of Chittagong; 
however the concept is relatively simple and enjoys a long tradition in many developing 
countries. The basic idea of micro-finance is to provide credit to working poor who otherwise 
would not have access to credit services. This service has been provided in variety in 
different countries by moneylenders in poor communities for a long time. 
In the economic history literature, there is a long-standing debate regarding the role of 
religion in stimulating economic growth. This debate began with Max Weber’s classic work 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930/ 1958). Weber claimed that the 
Protestant ethic, which focuses on personal agency and diligence, spurred economic 
development. Although Weber’s thesis has been disputed, the more general idea that certain 
                                                          
4 The broadly defined “poor people” by the World Bank are the population living under $1 or $2 per day per 
capita. The “poorest of the poor” in the microfinance industry, according to the latest Microcredit Summit 
Campaign Report (2013), refers to any of the 1.4 billion living on less than $1.25 per day adjusted for 
purchasing power parity, or families whose income is in the bottom 50 percent of all those living below their 
country’s poverty line. 
religious (Christian) attitudes may have positive economic implications continues to be 
discussed and supported (e.g., Iannaccone, 1998). The extensive debate regarding the 
historical role of religion in the development of modern capitalism sharply contrasts with the 
meager attention that has been devoted to religion in current development eﬀorts and 
research.  
Theories of religion and MFIs development factors 
Different theories have discussed the role of religion on the development factor of 
microfinance institutions. The Neo-classical growth model emphasizes the importance of 
savings in order for a country’s economy to grow. According to Todaro et al. (2003), one of 
the main constraints for poor households in developing countries is the lack of access to 
financial services. This is a consequence of poorly developed financial markets and 
commercial banks tending to offer its service almost exclusively to medium and large 
companies that are thought to be credit worthy. In view of neo-classical growth theories, it 
implies that the accumulation of capital is hampered and the growth of the country’s 
economy is restrained. The Welfarist theory focuses on reducing poverty through credit, 
often provided together with complementary services such as skills training and teaching of 
literacy and numeracy, health, nutrition and family planning. Robinson (2001) points out that 
under this approach, credit is provided to poor borrowers, typically at below market interest 
rates. The goal is to reach the extremely poor with credit to help them overcome poverty and 
also gain empowerment. The performance of the MFI‟s are measured through household 
studies with focus on the living standard of the individuals; number of saving accounts, 
number of loans, productivity improvement, incomes, capital accumulation, social services 
such as education and health as well as food expenditures(Congo,2002). 
Another theory connected to microfinance is the uniting theory of microfinance. This theory 
advocates for joint liability in the repayment of microfinance loans. The argument fronted by 
this theory is that joint liability could improve repayment rates and the welfare of credit-
constrained borrowers. In joint liability, when one borrower cannot repay a loan, group 
members are contractually require to pay instead. Second, the perception of joint liability can 
be implicit. Borrowers believe that if a group member defaults, the whole group will become 
ineligible for future loans even if the lending contract does not specify this punishment.5 
                                                          
5Ghatak and Gunnane (1999) 
The empowerment theory shows how microfinance loans can empower people to improve 
their standard of livings by enabling them to start businesses. The theory points out that 
women account for nearly74 percent of the 19.3 million of the world’s poorest people now 
being served by microfinance institutions. Most of these women have access to credit to 
invest in businesses that they own and operate themselves. The vast majority of them have 
excellent repayment records, in spite of the daily hardships they face. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, they have shown that it is a very good idea to lend to the poor and to 
women.6 
Religiosity effect on Islamic MFIS  
In sum, the forces that typically cause organizations in a ﬁeld to become similar are still not 
very strong in the international microﬁnance industry. In addition, Islamic and conventional 
MFIs are partly inﬂuenced by diﬀerent isomorphic factors because they normally have 
diﬀerent owners, often have diﬀerent donors or funders, and depend on public funding to 
diﬀerent degrees (secular MFIs typically are more dependent on public funding). Therefore, 
we expect substantial diﬀerences in the practices and potentially in the performances of 
Islamic and conventional MFIs. 
There are reasons to expect Islamic development organizations to diﬀer from their 
conventional counterparts. According to institutional theory, three major forces cause 
organizations in a ﬁeld to be more isomorphic, or similar (DiMaggio & Pow-ell, 1983). First, 
important actors, on whom organizations depend, such as governments or other parties with 
resources, may impose regulations or policies that lead to isomorphism. However, the 
microﬁnance industry is weakly regulated or unregulated in most countries. Second, 
organizations may mimic popular practices in other organizations, particularly in uncertain 
conditions. However, for now, we still believe that there is considerable freedom for each 
MFI to deﬁne its policies and practices according to its own ideology and objectives.  
In an interest free model of micro-finance in Islamic finance, it is suggested that four key 
principles must strictly be followed, such as 1) belief in divine guidance, 2) no dealings with 
riba or interest based transactions, 3) no dealings with other Shari`ah non-compliant 
transactions, 3) preferably dealings with risk sharing financial products and instruments, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
6Cheston and Kuhn (2002) 
4) financing based on involving in real assets (Abdullah & Chee, 2012). It is also suggested 
that the act of lending is to be treated more of as a moral phenomenon than a purely 
economic activity (Zaman, 1991). Borrowing is not prohibited in Islam though the Prophet 
(pbuh) discouraged taking loans unnecessarily. In this respect, the confluence of Islamic 
finance and micro-finance will solve the problem of income disparity, because the elements 
of riba or interest must be avoided in Islamic financial instruments and will refocus the MFI 
to its social course. 
The relatively new practice of Islamic micro-finance institutions has an outreach of only 1 
million Muslims compared to 650 million Muslims who are living below the average poverty 
line of developing countries. The very low outreach is due to Islamic micro-finance is a new 
phenomenon, and still is in the state of its infancy. The key is for the IMFIs to build capacity 
and capability to provide a diversified array of Shari`ah compliant Islamic micro-finance 
products to the Muslims in dire need of Islamic microfinancing. 
The IMFIs provide intermediary financial services by accepting funds from investors and 
other stakeholders on one hand, and disburse the funds with or without profits to poor micro-
entrepreneurs and households on the other hand, via an Islamic financial instrument The 
basic model consists of five essential components which are needed to complete a full cycle 
of Islamic microfinancing process, namely funding, an Islamic micro-finance institution, an 
Islamic financial instrument for disbursement of fund, the borrower, and the repayment. 
Social-financial performance Paradox 
It is argued that despite the phenomenal success of many both conventional and Islamic MFIs 
to alleviate poverty around the globe, the high interest rate on the microloan has increased the 
disparity between the rich and the poor sectors of the economy (Tahir, 2012). With more and 
more MFIs operating like commercial entities with the aim of maximizing profit and creating 
values for their shareholders, their social goal of alleviating poverty and fair distribution of 
income has suddenly become unattainable.  
With a strong social mission of outreaching to the poor and the poorest, MFIs have been 
receiving tremendous support from donor agencies, private investors and government 
authorities. On the one hand, the proven ability to be profitable of non-profit MFIs has 
brought for-profit institutions to the microfinance market, leading to increased competition in 
the sector (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005). On the other hand, donors and policy makers 
questioned the role of continuous subsidies and encourage the independence of MFIs from 
subsidies and become self-sustainability. From the first transformed NGO MFI (PRODEM, 
later BancoSol) in Bolivia to the IPO of Banco Compatamos in Mexico and SKS in India, 
growth and sustainability seem to be the main rhythm. The commercialization process and 
over-emphasis on sustainability apparently improve MFIs’financial performance and the 
scale in terms of total number of borrowers, yet concerns about mission drift also come along 
with this trend (Christen 2001;Drake and Rhyne, 2002; Copestake, 2007; Armendaritz and 
Szafarz, 2009; Mersland, 2010).That is, some MFIs in pursuit of better financial performance 
might have shifted away to serve the marginal poor or non-poor clients with larger loans 
instead of the original poor and the poorest who require smaller loans. 
From the theoretical perspective we do not get any unified solution of the puzzle of social-
financial performance paradox. Theoretically there’s a immense need to reexamine the 
Religiosity effect on religion development relationship through Islamic microfinance 
institutions.  
Empirical Literature  
Despite repeated claims that religions and religious beliefs represent an important yet 
neglected factor in development (e.g., Marshall & Keough, 2004; Ter Haar & Ellis, 2006; 
Thomas, 2005), empirical studies on the eﬀects of religion on development eﬀorts are scarce. 
Religion may inﬂuence the perceptions and behaviors of several parties in the develop-ment 
arena. Regarding the recipients of development eﬀorts, Ter Haar and Ellis (2006) claim that 
religious beliefs provide moral guidance and encourage people to improve their lives. 
Religion may also inﬂuence providers of development eﬀorts. For example, many 
international development organizations, such as Muslim Aid and Islamic Development 
Bank, are Islamic organizations. The microﬁnance industry is no exception. Several Islamic 
organizations are actively involved in advancing the microﬁnance industry. In this paper, we 
use microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) as examples of providers of development eﬀorts and 
determine the diﬀerences between Christian and secular MFIs in various dimensions of 
organizational performance. 
Thus far, the existence and eﬀect of religious actors in modern microﬁnance has not been 
addressed by rigorous research. Bussau and Mask (2003) outline the theological reasons why 
Christian actors should care about microﬁnance and entrepreneurship, and Harper et al. 
(2008) relate the stories of three religious MFIs: one Muslim, one Christian, and one Hindu. 
To the best of our knowledge, other, more academic sources are not available. 
The relationship between religion and development has been covered extensively through the 
years.  Poverty prevalence dates back to the existence of human beings. It has occupied 
foremost place on human development agendas of virtually all countries of the world 
including during the time of Islamic civilization where the implementation of Islamic-based 
economic principles was expected to lead to poverty alleviation.7 
Although many Western policy elites hold a secular world-view and equate modernization 
and secularization 8 many aid and development organizations are based on religious 
principles and are managed by people who are inspired by religious beliefs. More important, 
in a purely secular model, the basic values of large groups of poor people are ignored. 
Increasingly, several parties in the development arena seem to share this concern. A few 
years ago, the United Kingdom government initiated a project known as Faith in 
Development, a multimillion-pound research consortium. Similarly, the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs instituted the Knowledge Forum on Religion and Development Policy, and 
the Norwegian government recently launched a dialog initiative about religion and aid. The 
World Bank has delivered several reports on religion and development issues (e.g., Marshall 
&Keough, 2004). Clearly, there is no lack of policy interest concerning religion and 
development; however, empirical research regarding the influence of religion on 
development is fragmented and still in its infancy. 
The microfinance revolution, begun with independent initiatives in Latin America and South 
Asia starting in the 1970s, has so far allowed 65 million poor people around the world to 
receive small loans without collateral, build up assets, and buy insurance. Idea of 
microfinance programs has come from Dr. Yunus who began a microfinance program among 
women in Bangladesh in 1976 through the University of Chittagong; however the concept is 
relatively simple and enjoys a long tradition in many developing countries. The basic idea of 
micro-finance is to provide credit to working poor who otherwise would not have access to 
credit services. This service has been provided in variety in different countries by 
moneylenders in poor communities for a long time.9 
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The application of Islamic finance to microfinance was discussed in depth by Rahul and 
Sapcanin (1998). They demonstrate that Islamic banking, with its emphasis on risk sharing 
and, for certain products and collateral-free loans, is compatible with the needs of some 
micro-entrepreneurs. Viable projects that are rejected by conventional lending institutions 
because of insufficient collateral might prove to be acceptable to Islamic banks on a profit-
sharing basis However, they concluded that from a microfinance standpoint the mudaraba 
model (profit-sharing) has more drawbacks than the murabaha model (cost plus markup). The 
murabaha model is overall more cost effective, has a lower margin of error, and provides 
immediate collateral for a MFI because the MFI owns the goods until the last installment is 
paid. Dusuki (2006) has presented the idea of Islamic microfinance initiative in the 
perspective of Ibn Khaldun’s concept of ‘Asabiyah or social Solidarity that emphasizes group 
efforts and loyalty over self-interests of individuals. He argues that Islamic microfinance can 
be promoted through group lending to the poor who are normally denied access to 
mainstream banking services. 
Literature on sustainability-Outreach Paradox 
Explaining the sustainability-outreach relationship by investigating different conditions under 
which it may be affected, such as regulation (Cull et al., 2009b; Cull et al., 2009b; Mersland 
and Strøm, 2009), regional distribution (Awaworyi and Marr, 2014), competition (Kai, 2009; 
McIntosh and Wydick, 2005; Cull et al., 2009), financing (Borgan, 2009; Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007), and so forth. Conclusions are inconsistent-some suggest a trade-off 
relationship, some show a complementary linkage, while others indicate a mixed or no 
significant association between the two. 
Armendariz and Morduch (2010: 5-8) argued that poorer enterprises should be able to pay 
banks higher interest rates than richer enterprises. They also have the perception that money 
should flow from rich depositors to poor entrepreneurs. The money did not flow easily to the 
poor countries as predicted due to high credit risk resulting from lack of collaterals, high 
transaction costs, and weak legal enforcement mechanisms. One thing is right about the 
principle though is that the borrowers are forced to pay higher interest rate charged by the 
banks. In the case of Banco Compartamos, the largest Latin America micro-finance 
institution based in Mexico had charged its customers an average interest rate of roughly 
100% per annum while the yearly inflation rate in Mexico was around 4%. The extraordinary 
high returns had attracted more profit oriented capital when some MFIs like Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, Kenya’s Equity Bank and Banco Comparators went public in 2003, 2006 and 2007 
respectively for the shareholders to realised the value of their investment, although at the 
same time, the funding from the listing had allowed the banks to expand their outreach 
dramatically to more customers (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010: 239-241).  
Since giving and taking interest is categorically prohibited in IslamIMFIs cannot adopt the 
above mentioned profit-oriented model using interest.. Instead, it should emerge as a donor 
funded institution with clear mission of eradicating poverty and fulfilling just and equitable 
socio-economic development. The funding for IMFIs will be derived mainly from donations 
in the form of cash waqf, sadaqah, zakah, hibah and tabarru`, equity capital and the 
government's subsidies to partially finance the high transaction costs. In deciding on the type 
of funding, the IMFIs have to consider the costs, benefits, and nature of each fund. 
Due to the opposite nature of an MFI’s financial and social goals, it is difficult to find the 
best balance point at which trade-offs can be greatly minimized and financial performance 
can be maximized by providing small loans to poor and the poorest clients. Due to this 
reason, many early studies support the trade-off theory. For example, Conning (1999), who 
studies the linkage between outreach, sustainability and financial leverage for a dataset of 72 
MFIs, points out that sustainable MFIs targeting poorer borrowers should charge higher 
interest rates, undertake higher costs per loan and be less leveraged. Navajas et al. (2000) 
analyzes five Bolivian MFIs with high financial sustainability among peers and find that they 
are not targeting the poorest but rather those near the poverty line as the poorest are less 
likely to be creditworthy and to demand loans. Olivares-Polanco (2005) investigates the 
determinants of outreach in terms of loan size using data for 28 MFIs in Latin America for 
the years 1999-2001. Using Ordinary Least Square, he also confirms the trade-off between 
sustainability and outreach though he doesn’t specify the client poverty level. 
However, if affordability is a major issue concerning serving the poor and the poorest and 
being financially viable, then these two goals are compatible if MFIs can meet clients’ 
specific needs through innovative methods to develop suitable products and services. 
Gibbons and Meehan (1999) demonstrates three MFIs from Asia, Latin America and Africa 
respectively and argues that financial sustainability actually can be achieved by serving 
substantial number of the poorest clients. “Progressive” lending to this clientele, along with 
efficiency and other initiatives at the program level, enables the compatibility of these two 
goals. The paper also summaries some best practices on how to achieve it. Other supporters 
of the complementary view are Christen et al. (1995), Woller et al. (1999), Churchill (2000), 
Woller and Schreiner (2002), and so forth. 
Fernando (2004) summarizes three camps of hypothesizes on the issue of providing financial 
services to the poorest and its effects on financial sustainability. The first camp holds the 
opinion that the poorest can’t be reached on a sustainable basis due to the ineffective demand 
for financial services among the poorest, the high service delivery costs for MFIs, and the 
unaffordable prices charged by MFIs to the poorest. The second camp argues that the poorest 
can be reached on a sustainable and large-scale basis. If funding agencies provide more funds 
to these MFIs, outreach to the poorest can be rapidly increased. The third camp considers the 
potential for reaching the poorest on a sustainable but limited scale basis. Innovation in 
service delivery mechanisms is a must and subsidies play an important role in reaching the 
poorest in a sustainable way. Cull et al. (2007) are among the first to conduct a 
comprehensive empirical study using a global dataset of 124 MFIs in 49 countries. He 
divides the total sample based on different lending types and find mixed results. Individual-
based lenders perform better in terms of profitability but it is achieved through focusing less 
on very poor and women borrowers, indicating the existence of a trade-off. Meanwhile, the 
study also finds examples of institutions that have realized both profitability and outreach to 
the poor. As stated in their study, institutions making smaller loans are not necessarily less 
profitable when other relevant factors are included. However, the study doesn’t specifically 
focus on the poorest clients. Quayes (2012), based on MFIs’ disclosure level, divided the 
sample of 702 MFIs from 83 countries into two groups. The full sample shows that financial 
sustainability has no impact on the depth of outreach proxied by average loan size/GNI per 
capita. Though trade-off exists in low-disclosure MFIs, financial sustainability has a positive 
impact on the depth of outreach for the high disclosure MFIs. The results hold after 
considering the simultaneity issue by applying a three-stage least squares model. Not-for-
profit MFIs have better outreach but poorer financial performance in comparison to for-profit 
MFIs. Again, this study doesn’t provide further information on client poverty level. 
Gonzales and Rosenberg (2006) study the relationship between outreach, profitability and 
poverty using data reported to Microcredit Summit Campaign (MSC) and the MIX Market 
platform respectively. In the MIX Market data, the correlation between average loan size and 
profitability (measured by return on assets) is very weak and the slop of the curve is low. 
Using the percentage of the poorest clients and operational self-sufficiency from the MSC 
dataset, they find that the correlation between these variables and the slope for the 
relationship are still very weak and low. They conclude that there may be relatively little 
conflict between improving sustainability and reaching poorer clients and it can find 
individual MFIs who are strongly profitable while serving the very poor clients. 
It is hard to draw a consistent conclusion on this issue as the microfinance sector is still 
evolving. Besides, more diversified institutions with mixed clientele join the sector, making it 
harder to conclude. Recent empirical studies start to divide the total sample dataset into 
subsamples based on certain features that may affect the sustainability-outreach relationship. 
 
Methodology we used 
To examine the effect of religion this study employs System GMM on a panel dataset of 90 
conventional and Islamic MFIS and secondly, to test the threshold effect of social –financial 
performance paradox this study employs non linear Hansen threshold regression model. 
Generalized method of moments (GMM) 
Dynamic panel data regressions are characterized by two sources of persistence over time, 
namely, autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors and individual effects characterizing the heterogeneity among the individuals. The 
endogeneity problem associated with dynamic models is dealt with in this paper using the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
which is more efficient than the instrumental variable (IV) estimation procedure suggested by 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981). Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate additional instruments 
can be obtained in a dynamic panel data model if one utilizes the orthogonality conditions 
that exist between lagged values of the dependent variable and the disturbances. Using these 
moment conditions, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a two-step difference GMM 
estimator. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate however that the instruments used in the difference 
GMM estimator become less informative in two important cases. Firstly, as the 
autoregressive parameter increases toward unity; and second as the variance of the parameter 
effect increases relative to the variance of the transitory shocks. Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) propose that an additional mild stationarity restriction on the 
initial conditions process allows for the use of an extended system GMM estimator. The 
system GMM estimation is found to be more appropriate in the presence of variables that are 
close to a random walk (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2009). The difference GMM estimation 
under these conditions is found to suffer from a weak instrument problem (Sarafidis et. al, 
2009). The difference GMM approach also magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels (Roodman, 
2009). This motivates the use of forward orthogonal deviation transformations.  
In view of the above, we run both the two-step difference and system GMM estimations for 
our panel data set (see tables in the Appendix). We follow up with post estimation 
specification tests, namely the Sargan (1975) test for over-identifying restrictions and the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) test for no autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. We base our 
decision to proceed with the difference GMM estimation in spite of the above limitations, 
given the relatively low level of persistence in the time series dimension of capital buffers 
(average of around 0.34). High persistence in the series is a necessary condition for 
expectations of asymptotic efficiency gains using the system GMM10(Blundell and Bond, 
1998; Roodman, 2009). The application of difference GMM is also warranted given the 
estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable for the system estimator does not 
increase significantly on average relative to the two-step differenced estimator.  
Non linear hansen threshold  
Threshold regression models or sample splitting models have wide application in economics 
and applied econometric practice (Hansen 1999; Hansen 2000).It allows to endogenously 
determine the threshold level(s) at which the sample is split. It treats the threshold value(s) as 
unknown instead of arbitrarily deciding the splitting point. 
One important issue that most models have to concern is the endogeneity problem which 
occurs when an explanatory variable correlates with the error term due to omitted variables, 
measurement errors, or simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2006). Existing literature regarding 
sustainability and outreach address this issue differently. For example, Cull et al. (2009) 
don’t point out the endogeneity in the model. Quayes (2012) uses a three stage least square to 
cope with the simultaneity issue but doesn’t further address the endogeneity problem. In this 
sustainability regression model, I consider the potential existence of endogeneity between 
financial sustainability and outreach (both breadth and depth).Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
may lose its efficiency in estimating the coefficients. A common practice is to introduce 
instrumental variables (IVs) and to estimate the equation by the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM). 
Outreach is endogenous and is correlated with the error term. The asymptotic distribution of 
this test statistic is non-standard as the parameter  is not identified under the null hypothesis. 
Hansen (1996) and Caner and Hansen (2004) suggest a bootstrapping procedure to obtain the 
asymptotic P-value. Collect the estimated residual under the unrestricted model for each and 
then use this pseudo-dependent variable to replace to repeat the calculation above. The 
resulting SupW* statistic has the same asymptotic distribution as SupW.By repeating the 
simulation draws, the asymptotic p-value of the test statistic SupW can be calculated with 
arbitrary accuracy. 
This paper tries to investigate the threshold effects on the relationship between financial 
sustainability and social outreach. Operational self-sufficiency (OSS) is used as dependent 
variable to measure an MFI’s ability to cover costs through operating revenues without 
adjustment from donations and subsidies. Average loan size adjusted by GNI per capita, a 
proxy for depth of outreach, is included in order to make the results comparable to the 
existing literature. As mentioned earlier, it is a rough indicator of client poverty level. So the 
inclusion of the percentage of the poorest as a sample splitting point is expected to add more 
explanatory power to the sustainability-outreach relationship. Total active borrowers, a 
measurement for breadth of outreach, is included to observe its relationship with 
sustainability and depth of outreach. Besides, some other independent variables that are 
closed related to an MFI’s operation and are controllable at the institutional level are adopted, 
including an MFI’s cost, profit, risk, capital structure, size and age. 
Regarding social outreach, Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) view that financially efficient MFIs 
are also socially efficient in reaching the poor. This is not supported by Herms et al. (2011) 
who argue that improving efficiency may only be achieved if MFIs focus less on the poor. 
Serving the individual poorest may be more costly, but it is also possible for MFIs to benefit 
from the joint efficiency by serving the majority or exclusively the same segment. 
Variables 
 (a) Social performance 
Although most microﬁnance actors agree that both ﬁnancial and social objectives are 
important, there is no consensus as to how social performance should be measured (Hashemi, 
2007). Academic  researchers are therefore struggling to identify the appropriate variables to 
represent social performance. The average loan size and the targeting of female clients are the 
most widely used social outreach indicators in microﬁnance re- search (Cull, Demirgu¨ c-
Kunt, & Morduch 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2010) and are the variables used in this paper to 
represent social performance. 
 
(i) Outreach to poor clients 
Concern for the poor is a central biblical virtue. In fact, working is partly motivated by the 
opportunity to assist those in need. Average loan size is the most widely used indicator to 
indicate whether an MFI reaches poor customers. For MFIs oﬀering some big loans alongside 
many small loans, their average outstanding loan balances do not fully reﬂect their social 
proﬁles, and the average loan does not necessarily reﬂect the clients’ poverty level. 
Nevertheless, the average outstanding loan balance is constantly tracked by MFI boards, 
investors, and other stakeholders because it gives a rough measure of the MFI’s poverty 
focus.  
(ii) Targeting female clients 
Microﬁnance and women have always been intrinsically linked. Since  the experimental  
schemes in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s, microﬁnance has primarily targeted women 
(Aghion & Morduch, 2005). Women  are more likely  than men to repay their loans 
(D’Espallier, Guerin, & Mersland, 2011). In addition, by enabling women to develop or 
strengthen income-generating activities, microﬁnance  is likely to increase  their monetary  
income, their control over their income, and their bargaining power within the household. 
As with the average loan, the percentage of female clients is a proxy for social performance 
that is in dispute. Overreliance on serving women may actually cause harm to women. For 
example, women may be taking out loans for their husbands, or they may end up being in 
charge of the families’ monetary income, adding one more duty to a list that is often already 
unbalanced because of their sex. However, because servicing loans for women has been and 
continues to be at the forefront of the microﬁnance   
Financial Performances Four underlying variables constitute the majority of an MFI’s 
ﬁnancial  proﬁts: operational income, ﬁnancial  costs, operational  costs, and loan losses.  
(i) Maximizing operational income 
Operational income consists of the loan portfolio multiplied by the eﬀective interest rate. 
Most MFIs still operate in markets in which they have some oligopoly power and can decide 
their price levels to a certain extent. In some markets, such as Ecuador, there are interest rate 
caps established by the government, but within those caps, MFIs determine the prices of their 
services.  
(ii) Minimizing  ﬁnancial costs 
A main diﬀerence between microﬁnance and regular banking is that ﬁnance costs are 
relatively less important than operational costs in microﬁnance. This diﬀerence occurs 
because operational costs are high and subsidized funding is available. 
(iii) Minimizing  operational costs 
From a theoretical standpoint, operational eﬃciency is probably the most interesting variable 
in an analysis of the economic inﬂuence of religion. This topic also has the most developed 
academic literature pertaining to the economic  inﬂuence of religion.   McCullough and 
Willoughby (2009) present a comprehensive and critical review of this literature. They 
conclude that some types of religious beliefs, behavior, and cognition  foster self-regulation 
and self-control, which in turn have positive implications in terms of stronger task diligence 
and persistence and a better capacity to change behavior according  to the feelings and wishes 
of other people. In a principal-agent model, self-control should reduce agency costs and have 
a positive eﬀect on orga- nizational eﬃciency. 
In addition to self-control and self-regulation  eﬀects, reli- gion may stimulate work 
motivation by sanctifying work goals (Emmons,  1999). A series of studies shows that when 
people think of their work as a divine calling, they ﬁnd their work more rewarding and spend 
more time on work (Wrezsniewski, McCauley, Rozin, & Schwartz, 1997), they are more 
commit- ted to work goals, and they are among the strongest believers in success  at work 
(Emmons,  Cheung,  & Tehrani,   1998; Mahoney  et al., 2005). 
Wooten, Coker, and Elmore  (2003) observed that religious NGOs were too focused on their 
religious missions at the expense of ﬁnancial control. Likewise, some authors argue that 
Christian MFIs should have a triple bottom line—ﬁnancial  results, social results, and 
spiritual results—and that, for example, high client/staﬀ eﬃciency ratios are incompatible  
with the achievement of spiritual results (Bussau & Mask, 2003). 
A similar type of goal bias could be observed  with the boards of religious organizations. 
Board members who represent religious organizations may focus primarily on the theological 
proﬁles of  the  organizations   and the  spiritual leadership of leader candidates. Thus, the 
leaders of such organizations may have the “right theology” but may have subpar 
management skills.  
(iv) Minimizing loan losses 
Modern   microﬁnance was intended as a response to the high default rates in subsidized rural 
credit from the 1950s to the 1980s (Hulme  & Mosley,  1996). Thus, the low default rates in 
microﬁnance are one of the industry’s main achievements. 
However, not all MFIs report low default rates. In our data set, the default  rates, which  are 
measured as the proportion of a portfolio that is more than 30 days in arrears (PaR30), range 
from 0% to 97%. Therefore, not all MFIs enjoy low default rates, and this variance probably 
indicates that keeping defaults down is to a large extent a managerial issue.  
First, we use a broad range of ﬁnancial performance measures but only two indicators  of 
social performance: average loan size and percentage of female clients served. Though  these 
are the mostly used social indicators in microﬁnance research and management, we admit 
that they do not necessarily indicate an MFI’s social results. Therefore, if possible, future 
research should include additional indicators to study the social performance of MFIs. 
Moreover, we recommend researchers to look deeper into the female gender bias in 
microﬁnance.  
Data and Methodology 
This paper focuses exclusively on social and financial performance of 90 Islamic and 
conventional microfinance institutions. Data is update to 2014.  Data is collected from 
microfinance regulatory authority of Bangladesh.  
The representativeness of the sample is always an important issue. Although the MRA data 
are considered among the most representative data that are available for studying both 
Islamic and conventional microﬁnance industry, no data set is perfectly representative of the 
microﬁnance ﬁeld. For instance, our set contains relatively few of the largest MFIs and does 
not cover the virtually inﬁnite number of small savings and credit cooperatives active in the 
industry. Overall, we believe that our data-base provides a more representative image of the 
microﬁnance industry compared with other available data sets, such as Mixmarket 
(www.mixmarket.org), which has a well-known large ﬁrm bias. 
 
 
 
Correlation 
 
 
Difference GMM 
femaleclie~s         472    127659.9      943311         78    9463607
 totalequity         320    4.85e+08    2.96e+09     173415   1.90e+10
         roe         440    .3964091    1.020588          0      11.66
    portflio         436    26.52213    57.73138          0     905.77
                                                                      
       loans         473    1.15e+09    8.81e+09    1458360   1.06e+11
         cpb         436     .071055    .1249029          0       1.81
    loanloss         442    .0137557     .056668          0        .93
 averageloan         471    7474.643    3267.208    1412.31   19173.55
         oss         394    189.5699    1107.404          0      13691
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
    portflio     0.0121  -0.0450  -0.0960   0.0487   0.0507   0.9646  -0.0169   1.0000
femaleclie~s    -0.1300   0.1485  -0.1438   0.6529   0.7004   0.0537   1.0000
         cpb    -0.0659  -0.0159  -0.1273   0.0935   0.1045   1.0000
     lequity    -0.3224   0.2284  -0.1519   0.9030   1.0000
      lloans    -0.1311   0.4514  -0.2383   1.0000
   lloanloss    -0.2202  -0.0252   1.0000
   lloansize    -0.0687   1.0000
         oss     1.0000
                                                                                      
                    oss lloans~e lloanl~s   lloans  lequity      cpb female~s portflio
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                    
Observations                   49              34              49              34   
                                                                                    
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
Constant                        0               0               0               0   
                              (.)             (.)             (.)             (.)   
Dummy Islamic                   0               0               0               0   
                          (-0.99)         (-1.93)         (-1.05)         (-1.86)   
lequity                    -8.468          -25.83          -8.468          -25.83   
                           (0.70)          (1.10)          (0.99)          (1.99)   
lloans                      6.082           11.69           6.082           11.69*  
                          (-2.72)         (-2.45)         (-2.87)         (-2.73)   
lloanloss                  -11.88**        -12.64*         -11.88**        -12.64** 
                           (0.01)          (1.26)          (0.02)          (1.43)   
lloansize                   0.140           21.50           0.140           21.50   
                          (-0.37)         (-0.30)         (-1.29)         (-1.59)   
Femaleclients         -0.00000176     -0.00000153     -0.00000176     -0.00000153   
                           (1.11)          (1.55)          (1.42)          (2.33)   
ROE                         16.82           36.48           16.82           36.48*  
                           (2.66)          (0.21)          (2.51)          (0.35)   
Portflio                    0.406**         0.208           0.406*          0.208   
                          (-2.69)         (-1.81)         (-2.55)         (-2.84)   
CPB                        -299.3**        -259.3          -299.3*         -259.3** 
                                          (-1.92)                         (-3.41)   
L2.OSS                                     -0.623                          -0.623***
                           (0.76)          (0.23)          (0.89)          (0.51)   
L.OSS                       0.170          0.0595           0.170          0.0595   
                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2    Model 3 Mo~4    diff22robust   
                                                                                    
Difference GMM
System GMM  
 
Sargan Test  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                    
Observations                   82              86              82              86   
                                                                                    
                           (0.96)         (-2.62)          (0.94)         (-1.03)   
Constant                    114.3          -583.2**         114.3          -583.2   
                           (0.92)          (2.66)          (0.95)          (1.08)   
Dummy Islamic               25.52           138.3**         25.52           138.3   
                          (-2.00)                         (-2.65)                   
lequity                    -16.33*                         -16.33**                 
                           (1.21)         (-1.52)          (2.33)         (-0.63)   
lloans                      9.058          -14.75           9.058*         -14.75   
                          (-3.24)         (-2.05)         (-3.40)         (-2.00)   
lloanloss                  -12.90**        -9.996*         -12.90***       -9.996*  
                          (-0.44)          (5.36)         (-0.54)          (0.95)   
lloansize                  -4.778           86.91***       -4.778           86.91   
                          (-0.62)          (0.42)         (-1.45)          (0.49)   
Femaleclients         -0.00000275      0.00000278     -0.00000275      0.00000278   
                           (0.83)          (0.12)          (1.01)          (0.05)   
ROE                         11.66           1.960           11.66           1.960   
                           (2.90)          (3.34)          (2.55)          (1.10)   
Portflio                    0.414**         3.018***        0.414*          3.018   
                          (-2.99)         (-2.46)         (-2.62)         (-2.07)   
CPB                        -309.1**        -287.8*         -309.1**        -287.8*  
                                           (1.48)                          (0.96)   
L2.OSS                                      0.133                           0.133   
                          (-0.44)         (-1.06)         (-0.27)         (-0.60)   
L.OSS                     -0.0621          -0.132         -0.0621          -0.132   
                                                                                    
                          Model 1         Model 2    Model 3 Mo~4    system22ro~t   
                                                                                    
System GMM
        Prob > chi2  =    0.2162
        chi2(17)     =  21.22822
        H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
According to Difference and System GMM both of methods indicate similar results for most of 
the variable. For social peroformance it is OSS of microfinance institutions in case of system 
GMM while difference GMM shows it insignificant. Interestingly Bank size is also significant 
for System and difference GMM model but in robust model. Savings rate is significant in 
conventional MFIs in system GMM model but insignificant in difference GMM model. 
Operational income is insignificant in both System and difference GMM model. The major 
finding is the significant relationship of political stability and education to the savings deposit of 
commercial banks. At the same time dummy Islamic also found significant in case of System 
GMM.  
Having found focus variables have significant effect on banks deposits, and control variables 
have similar effect in most of the cases, it is needed to determine the appropriate method from 
the two methods. In selecting appropriate model, we just concern difference and System GMM 
Method.  From both tables, different models and diagnostic tests, we can summarize that system 
GMM is most suitable for this study. According to system GMM, political stability and 
education has significant effect on customer deposits of commercial banks.  Result also shows 
that religion has also significant impact on banks customer deposits. 
System GMM may cause consistency problem. To solve that we run sargan test but it can’t be 
run for difference GMM. So for our study in this case we prefer system GMM model and that it 
proves the exiting effect of religion, political stability and education. 
With an Islamic microfinance dummy we wanted to see the effect of religion on development 
factors. As indicated in the above table our main findings for microfinance institutions are 
broadly confirmed after controlling for time fixed effects. The coefficient is significantly higher 
than the comparable coefficient for conventional microfinance institutions, and does not support 
arguments that Islamic microfinance are less likely to perform.   
This result shows the performance of Islamic and conventional MFIs applying system GMM. We 
can see here loans loss and advances are negatively significant with financial performance of 
microfinance institutions. It implies that the less loan loss will lead to the better performance of 
micro finance institutions. Cost per borrower and female clients also found significant 
relationship with the performance of microfinance institutions.  Average loan size and total 
equity do not have any significant relationship with the performance of MFIs.  
Interesting part of this result is that Dummy Islamic found highly significant to the performance 
of microfinance institutions. That implies that Islamic principles have significant effect on the 
performance of Microfinance Institutions. This result supports the possible success of the 
proposed model that based on Islamic rules and principles.  
Threshold Regression 
This paper pays particular attention to the poorest of the poor and questions whether and how 
improvement of the percentage of poorest clients served by an MFI will affect its financial 
sustainability and the relationship with average loan size proxied for depth of outreach. Using a 
cross-sectional data sample of 90 MFIs in Bangladesh as of December 2013 by applying the 
threshold regression model developed by Caner and Hansen (2004). Threshold regression models 
or sample splitting models have wide application in economics and applied econometric practice 
(Hansen 1999; Hansen 2000).It allows to endogenously determine the threshold level(s) at which 
the sample is split. It treats the threshold value(s) as unknown instead of arbitrarily deciding the 
splitting point. 
 
By applying the sample splitting technique of Caner and Hansen (2004), we did not get any 
significant threshold value.The corresponding p-value (1) of the SupW test reported in Table 3 
suggests the no existence of the threshold. 
The results show that poverty targeting, proxied by the percentage of the poorest, has not any 
significant threshold effects on sustainability. The trade-off and complementary relationship 
between financial sustainability and depth of outreach in terms of average loan size are observed 
simultaneously in this dataset. This result rejects the hypothesis of micro-finance social –
financial performance paradox.  
The linear regression for the full sample shows that MFIs’ financial sustainability is positively 
related with average loan size in the case of both before and after dealing with the potential 
endogeneity problem. These results are compatible to most of the existing literature supporting 
the trade-off theory. Trade-off occurs when MFIs serve a mixed clientele with a relatively high 
percentage of the poor and the poorest. On the other hand, when the percentage of the poorest is 
relatively low and MFIs are actually serving a large number of marginally poor or non-poor 
clients, this positive correlation can be considered as a complementary relationship since 
wealthier clients demand bigger loans. In this case, there exists the possibility of mission drift. 
However, we lack enough information on other poverty levels of clients except for the 
percentage of the poorest.  
A better control over operating cost in low poverty targeting MFIs can greatly improve their 
efficiency and further financial sustainability levels. However, cost per borrower, calculated as 
the ratio of total operating expense divided by total number of active borrowers, is much smaller 
in high poverty targeting MFIs than in low poverty targeting MFIs in this sample due to the 
larger total number of borrowers. This finding is consistent with Littlefield et al (2003) who 
point out that programs serving very poor clients perform better than others in terms of cost per 
borrower. Portfolio yield shows a positive relationship with financial sustainability linearly and 
non-linearly. Yet, the estimated coefficient in high poverty targeting MFIs is much smaller than 
it is in low poverty targeting MFIs (0.885 versus 1.757). That is, high poverty targeting MFIs 
have to charge higher interest rates in order to achieve the same level of financial sustainability 
as low poverty targeting MFIs. Statistics on the subsamples show that the mean value of 
portfolio yield in low poverty targeting MFIs is slightly higher (36.6%) than it is in high poverty 
targeting MFIs (35.3%).It is in accordance with Conning (1999) who recommends MFIs to 
charge higher interest rates to poor borrowers in order to achieve financial sustainability. 
Loan loss reserve is negatively correlated with financial sustainability. The negative coefficient 
in high poverty targeting MFIs is smaller (-2.713) and significant at 5% level while low poverty 
targeting MFIs significantly correlated with sustainability at 1% level. This suggests that a better 
control over default risk in low poverty targeting MFIs can largely improve their sustainability. 
In fact, Table 6.2 shows that high poverty targeting MFIs have higher mean value of the reserve 
level than low targeting MFIs. Gross loan portfolio has positive effects on financial sustainability 
in the full sample linear regression and the threshold regression with a higher coefficient in high 
poverty targeting MFIs. Given that high poverty targeting MFIs are providing much smaller 
loans in average, the total size is smaller than low poverty targeting MFIs. 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implication 
Our inquiry is centered on the effect of religiosity and threshold on social and financial 
performance of Microfinance Institutions. From the empirical study we find that religion has 
significant effect on microfinance institutions performance while threshold does not have effect 
on microfinance at least in case of Bangladesh. Our ﬁndings present important insights for 
Islamic microfinance manager and donors as well as policy makers. We thus recommend 
managers and donors to ensure that Islamic inspiration translates into beneﬁts for clients. 
Government agencies and social impact investors may also help MFIs in the wider inclusion of 
the poorest population. Social performance will harmonize the financial performance of 
microfinance institutions, so the MFIs authorities should not be worried about the financial 
stability while focusing on outreaching the poor.  
However, there are shortcomings too. For instance, the often-refuted-and-repeated “high 
financing costs” criticism against conventional MFIs may be investigated in a more scientific 
manner by analyzing financial data of a sample of MFIs by undertaking a cross-sectional 
comparison of costs of undertaking various operations. It would also be pertinent to get more 
systematic information for a number of countries on the size of Islamic microfinance relative to 
the overall microfinance industry. Additionally information on how the Islamic microfinance 
component is performing in relation to conventional microfinance based on a set of benchmark 
indicators should be examined. On the overall, our study may help create incentives for 
researchers to pursue further inquiries into an area extremely promising.    
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